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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











BAYSIDE STATE PRISON; NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;  
RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW JERSEY;  
THE UNIVERSITY OF MEDICINE & DENTISTRY OF NEW JERSEY;  
JOHN POWELL, Individually and as Administrator of Bayside State Prison;  
GARY M. LANIGAN, Individually and as Commissioner of the New Jersey  
Department of Corrections; JOHN DOES NOC. 1-25 OF BAYSIDE STATE PRISON 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey 
(D. N.J. No. 1-14-cv-05344) 
District Court Judge:  Honorable Robert B. Kugler 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
December 15, 2017 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, RESTREPO and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
 





                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 




FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Anthony Fox was an inmate at Bayside State Prison in Leesburg, New Jersey. 
Based on a medical mishap, Fox filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Bayside and 
associated entities. The District Court dismissed Fox’s claims, and we will affirm. 
I 
 In August 2012, Fox reported to the prison infirmary complaining of dizziness. 
After discovering that Fox’s blood pressure was elevated, the infirmary nurse injected 
him with medication. Fox subsequently lost consciousness and fell to the floor, suffering 
injuries to his face and nose. Fox was taken to the hospital, and upon his return officials 
placed him in “lock-up.” The parties do not define the term lock-up, but we assume it 
denotes a punitive confinement status. Fox was placed in lock-up upon suspicion that his 
loss of consciousness was precipitated by some form of drug abuse. Fox remained in 
lock-up for about three weeks and was released when toxicology results disproved 
officials’ drug use suspicions. 
 Fox alleges that his medical treatment upon his return to Bayside was improper. 
Fox eventually underwent surgery to repair his nose damage, but claims that his surgery 
was too long delayed and insufficient. He alleges that Bayside officials continue to deny 
him additional, necessary surgeries. As a result, Fox suffers from significant breathing 
issues and facial deformity. 
 3 
 
 Fox filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Bayside State 
Prison, the New Jersey Department of Corrections (DOC), Bayside administrator John 
Powell, and DOC Commissioner Gary Lanigan.1 Fox’s complaint focuses on alleged 
deficiencies in his medical treatment and his placement in lock-up. The District Court 
dismissed the claims against Bayside and the DOC on sovereign immunity grounds. To 
the extent Powell and Lanigan were sued in their official capacities, they also fell within 
the District Court’s sovereign immunity ruling. As to their individual capacities, the 
District Court dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).2 
II 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a District Court’s dismissal based on sovereign 
immunity under a plenary standard.3 We apply the same standard when reviewing a 
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).4 In reviewing Fox’s complaint, we accept all well-pled 
allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor.5 
                                              
1 Fox’s suit also named Rutgers University and the University of Medicine and 
Dentistry of New Jersey as defendants. The District Court granted summary judgment as 
to those defendants, and Fox has not appealed those rulings. 
2 Fox does not challenge the District Court’s dismissal of his related state law 
claims. 
3 Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 694 (3d Cir. 1996). 





A. Sovereign Immunity 
 The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state governments in federal courts. 
This immunity extends to any entity that is an arm of the state.6 We have adopted a three-
part test to determine whether an entity is an arm of the state,7 but a detailed application 
of that test is unnecessary here. The DOC is quintessentially an arm of the state and is 
funded by, controlled by, and accountable to the state.8 As a facility wholly owned and 
operated by the DOC, Bayside is similarly protected. In their official capacities, Powell 
and Lanigan are likewise protected because “a suit against a state official in his or her 
official capacity . . . is a suit against the official’s office” that is “no different from a suit 
against the State itself.”9 Accordingly, the District Court did not err in applying sovereign 
immunity to these defendants. 
B. Section 1983 Claims 
 In their individual capacities, Powell and Lanigan are unprotected by sovereign 
immunity and subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The gravamen of Fox’s complaint 
is that the medical care he received at Bayside—both before and after his injury—was 
                                              
6 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429–30 (1997). 
7 Fitchik v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655, 659 (3d Cir. 1989). 
8 See Snyder v. Baumecker, 708 F. Supp. 1451, 1455–56 (D.N.J. 1989) (describing 
the characteristics of the DOC); cf. Koslow v. Pennsylvania, 302 F.3d 161, 169 (3d Cir. 
2002) (determining that the Pennsylvania DOC was entitled to sovereign immunity and 
then analyzing whether Congress had abrogated said immunity by statute). 
9 Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). 
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deficient. In so pleading, Fox invokes terms indicative of two distinct theories of relief 
under § 1983: failure to supervise and deliberate indifference. On both counts, however, 
Fox’s pleadings are deficient. 
 To state a claim for failure to supervise, a plaintiff must: 
identify a supervisory policy or practice that the supervisor 
failed to employ, and then prove that: (1) the policy or 
procedures in effect at the time of the alleged injury created 
an unreasonable risk of a constitutional violation; (2) the 
defendant-official was aware that the policy created an 
unreasonable risk; (3) the defendant was indifferent to that 
risk; and (4) the constitutional injury was caused by the 
failure to implement the supervisory practice or procedure.10 
 
In this vein, Fox avers that “defendants were aware of . . . the need for additional rules, 
regulations, testing, policies, [and] procedures”11 to provide adequate medical care to 
inmates, but the complaint is fatally lacking in detail. At the outset, Fox fails to identify a 
specific policy to undergird his claim, which necessarily forecloses the possibility of 
adequately pleading that any risk associated with the policy was unreasonable, that prison 
officials were aware of and indifferent to this risk, and that the specific policy led to his 
injury. Accordingly, Fox fails to plead a valid failure to supervise claim. 
 An official’s deliberate indifference to an individual’s constitutional rights 
provides an alternative basis for relief under § 1983. As relevant here, a prison official’s 
deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the 
                                              
10 Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 317 (3d Cir. 2014), rev’d on 
other grounds sub nom. Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042 (2015) (per curiam). 
11 App. 33. 
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Eighth Amendment.12 To plead such a claim, however, it is necessary—though not 
sufficient—to allege that the “official was subjectively aware of the risk.”13 Fox claims 
that the “conduct of defendants . . . constituted a breach of . . . duty and was in deliberate 
indifference to the danger and substantial risk facing plaintiff,”14 but the complaint lacks 
any assertion that either Powell or Lanigan was aware of any risk in this case, let alone “a 
substantial risk of serious harm.”15 Thus, the complaint fails to state a deliberate 
indifference claim. 
IV 
 For all of these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
                                              
12 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). 
13 Id. at 829. 
14 App. 33. 
15 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 829. The complaint does allege that “Lanigan[] had specific 
knowledge of the within conduct and policy and practice and took no steps to prevent 
said actions,” App. 32, but this assertion falls quite short of identifying a specific policy 
and alleging that Lanigan was subjectively aware that this policy posed a substantial risk 
of serious harm. 
